


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2 September 1952



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

- I. The Problem: Shall national estimates (NIE's, SE's and SIE's) continue to be issued with Tabs annexed.
- II. Facts Bearing on the Problem:
 1. The four Service intelligence organizations (including the JIG) have in the past often objected - with varying degrees of force - to issuing national estimates with Tabs or Appendixes attached.
 2. The four Service intelligence organizations are presently unanimously objecting to the issuance of NIE-69 (Probable Developments in North Africa) with an Appendix. I anticipate similar objections on forthcoming estimates.
 3. The Board of National Estimates and the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, favor the issuance of national estimates with Tabs attached, whenever in their opinion a Tab adds to the usefulness of the paper. They favor a Tab for NIE-69 and for other key estimates now in process.
- III. Discussion:
 1. In the past the DDCI (Mr. Jackson) and the DDI have advised the Board of National Estimates that in their opinion the conclusions of some national estimates should be more strongly supported by facts and by reasoning from facts. The Board concurs in this view.
 2. The Senior Staff of the NSC has expressed a keen desire for a fuller array of the facts upon which the conclusions of national estimates are based.
 3. Other consumers have expressed themselves similarly (Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; the Intelligence

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Officer of the Federal Civil Defense Administration - on estimates of primary importance to his agency --; key members of the staff of the Psychological Strategy Board, and others).

4. The Board has endeavored to meet the criticism of the DDCI and DDI and the requests of consumers by including as much factual material in Tabs as in its judgment is appropriate, and by issuing the estimate in question with the Tab attached.

5. The Service intelligence organizations have varied in their attitude towards Tabs.

a. For example, they have not as a general rule opposed Tabs which were maps, or which were tables of estimated military strengths, or which were tables of military end items, or which were rough inventories of the strategic resources of another state.

b. In only a few instances, however, have the Service intelligence representatives insisted upon the inclusion of a Tab.

c. They have, as a rule, been either lukewarm or definitely opposed to Tabs which were of a general political, social, or economic nature.

6. The question of a Tab on NIE-69 (Probable Developments in North Africa) will come up in the IAC on Thursday. The Tab now affixed to this estimate is a brief round-up of basic political, social, and economic facts on each of the North African areas discussed.

7. The issue as presented by this particular estimate may be used to open the larger question of Tabs in general.

IV. Recommendation:

1. I recommend that you take a firm stand in favor of issuing NIE-69 with the Tab affixed.

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Reasons for this stand:

- a. NIE-69 was requested by the Senior Staff of the NSC to serve that body as the intelligence background for the NSC North African policy paper. The Senior Staff has expressed its interest in having facts to support the conclusions of national estimates.
 - b. NIE-69 is concerned with six areas (Tangier, Spanish Morocco, French Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya). Each differs considerably from every other in its characteristics. The brief round-up of factual material in the Tab is designed to point up these differences.
 - c. For the small amount of space allotted (about twelve pages in the printed version) the value to the second or third echelon will be great. The first echelon reader need not concern himself with the Tab.
2. If the discussion of this Tab is broadened to include all Tabs on national estimates, I recommend that you assert an unwillingness to discuss at this time the larger question of Tabs in general.

Reasons: NIE-64, Part I (Soviet Capabilities for General War, through Mid-1953) will be before the IAC soon; it now has rather extensive Tabs (which in my opinion it merits); I hope the issue of their appropriateness will not be prejudiced in advance of a full discussion.

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SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
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